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INTRODUCTION

Education is a cornerstone of the American political landscape
and a foundation of the “American dream.” It prepares children for
their future, it sustains a successful democracy as it continues to
develop, and it propels us into our future as a nation. It is a unique
issue in that support and strategy in education is far more bipartisan
than in many other political issues.1 There has been much discussion
over the past several years about reforming a broken education
system.2 President Barack Obama has spoken extensively on
education issues in the United States throughout his presidency,3 with
particular focus on early learning, postsecondary education, and
* Angela Estrella-Lemus is a third year student at Pepperdine University
School of Law. I would like to thank Emily Casey, for all of her help and guidance
in the early stages of writing this article. Thank you to Sam, for always having
seasonal candy in the office, for reading this article (and every article in this issue)
over and over again, and for being such an impressive journal partner this year (If
you are reading this in a book right now, we did it!). Finally, and most
importantly, thank you to my mom, my dad, and my sister, Christina, for being my
three favorite people.
1

Alex Altman, Education Reform: Obama’s Bipartisan Issue?, TIME (Mar. 17,
2010), http://content.time.com/time/politics/article/0,8599,1972820,00.html.
2
John Converse Townsend, How Should We Rebuild the U.S. Education
(Feb.
15,
2013),
System?,
FORBES
http://www.forbes.com/sites/ashoka/2013/02/15/how-should-we-rebuild-the-u-seducation-system/.
3
See President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President on a World-Class
Education at McGavock High School (Jan. 30, 2014), transcript available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/01/30/remarks-president-worldclass-education (discussing the importance of education, rewarding the best
teachers, and high-quality early education); see also Sam Dillon, Obama Calls for
Major Change in Education Law, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 13, 2010,
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/14/education/14child.html?pagewanted=all
(describing President Obama’s call for an overhaul of No Child Left Behind); Jason
Koebler, Obama Pushes STEM in State of the Union, U.S. NEWS & WORLD
REPORT
(Jan.
25,
2014),
http://www.usnews.com/news/blogs/stemeducation/2012/01/25/obama-pushes-stem-in-state-of-the-union
(identifying
President Obama’s focus on STEM in the State of the Union); President Barack
Obama, Prepared Remarks of President Barack Obama: Back to School Event
(Sept.
8,
2009),
transcript
available
at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/MediaResources/PreparedSchoolRemarks (discussing
personal responsibility for education).
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teacher education.4 Regardless of the issue, education is always at
least part of the answer. President Obama says, “If we want America
to lead in the 21st century, nothing is more important than giving
everyone the best education possible—from the day they start
preschool to the day they start their career.”5 The country needs
quality teachers, smaller classrooms, and a focus on science,
technology, engineering, and mathematics education. All of these
things are important, but the education agenda caters to the majority
(as is necessary for a national agenda of any kind), which inevitably
leaves certain subgroups out of the big picture of education.
Special education, a term that refers to the education of students
with disabilities, is a subset of the education system with specific
requirements and strategies, as such students have specific needs.6
By its nature, special education is different from general education
because it must be different. Students with disabilities often have to
overcome hardships due to their disabilities, which make it more
challenging for them to learn and receive a valuable education.
They have to exist in an education system that, on a large scale, was
not built for them.

4

See Alyson Klein, Obama Sells Race to the Top Early-Childhood Education
in State of the Union, EDUCATION WEEK BLOGS (Jan. 28, 2014, 9:44 PM),
http://blogs.edweek.org/edweek/campaign-k12/2014/01/president_obama_renews_call_fo.html (discussing President Obama’s
focus on early-childhood education in the State of the Union); see also Elizabeth
Green, Building A Better Teacher, N.Y TIMES, Mar. 2, 2010,
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/07/magazine/07Teachers-t.html?pagewanted=all
(discussing the issues with improving teacher quality); Tamar Lewin, Obama’s
Plan Aims to Lower Cost of College, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 22, 2013,
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/22/education/obamas-plan-aims-to-lower-costof-college.html (discussing President Obama’s proposals to make college more
affordable).
5
Press Release, Office of the Press Secretary, The White House, New Report
Highlights Impacts of Teacher Layoffs, Need to Invest in Education (Aug. 18,
2012), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/08/18/newreport-highlights-impacts-teacher-layoffs-need-invest-education;
see
also
EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, Investing in Our Future: Returning
Teachers
to
the
Classroom
(Aug.
2012),
available
at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/Investing_in_Our_Future_Report
.pdf.
6
20 U.S.C. § 1401(29) (2012).
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This comment analyzes the Individuals with Disabilities
Education Act (IDEA) and the Americans with Disabilities Act
(ADA), and the protections they afford to students with disabilities.
In theory, these two acts, which both provide for individuals with
disabilities, should be able to coexist, but in practice, there is conflict
between the ADA and the IDEA with respect to how to provide for
students with disabilities.7 The ADA and the IDEA have two
significant differences.8 First, the two acts have different purposes.9
The ADA has noneducational objectives—providing individuals with
disabilities the same opportunities as those without disabilities.10 In
comparison, the IDEA has specifically educational objectives—
providing individuals with disabilities the same educational
opportunities as those without disabilities.11 Second, Congress
intended the IDEA to govern issues of education, as seen through the
most recent amendments to the ADA and the IDEA, respectively.12
Given these differences, courts have difficulty developing a unified
theory for addressing claims that are brought under both the ADA
and the IDEA.13
Part II discusses the relevant federal statutes relating to the issue
of educating students with disabilities.14 Part III discusses the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals case, K.M. ex rel. Bright v. Tustin Unified
School District,15 presenting the issue regarding the interrelationship
of the IDEA and the ADA.16 In this case, the court of appeals ruled
that failure of an IDEA claim does not preclude an ADA claim on the
same issue.17 This case, deciding an issue of first impression for the
Ninth Circuit, sets precedent for an inefficient and costly way of

7

See infra Part V.
See infra Part V.A.
9
See infra Part V.A.
10
See infra Part V.A.
11
See infra Part V.A.
12
See infra Part V.B.
13
See infra Part III.B.
14
See infra Part II.
15
725 F.3d 1088 (9th Cir. 2013), cert. denied 134 S.Ct. 1493 (2014), cert.
denied 134 S.Ct. 1494 (2014).
16
See infra Part III.
17
See infra Part III.
8
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providing remedies for issues of special education in California.18
Part IV discusses general education, special education, and funding
education in California.19 Part V compares the IDEA and the ADA
and suggests that California courts should treat the IDEA as having
primacy over the ADA in matters of special education.20
II.

HISTORY OF FEDERAL STATUTES ADDRESSING EDUCATION OF
INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES
A.

Rehabilitation Act of 1973 Section 504

The first two major decisions to address individuals with
disabilities and start the movement addressing special education were
Pennsylvania Association for Retarded Children (PARC) v.
Pennsylvania,21 and Mills v. Board of Education.22 These cases
“expand[ed] on the Brown decision . . . by establishing that denying
education to children with disabilities or treating them differently
within the educational system was a denial of equal protection and
due process under the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution.”23
The Supreme Court held that a school district is obligated to provide
school-age children a "free and suitable publicly-supported education
regardless of the degree of the child's . . . disability or impairment."24
Following these two cases was the 1973 Rehabilitation Act25—which
18

See infra Part III.
See infra Part IV.
20
See infra Part V.
21
334 F. Supp. 1257 (E.D. Pa. 1971). “Having undertaken to provide a free
public education to all of its children, including its exceptional children, the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania may not deny any mentally retarded child access
to a free public program of education and training.” Id. at 1259.
22
348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972). “[T]he Board of Education has an
obligation to provide whatever specialized instruction that will benefit the child.
By failing to provide plaintiffs and their class the publicly supported specialized
education to which they are entitled, the Board of Education violates the above
statutes and its own regulations.” Id. at 874.
23
LAURA ROTHSTEIN & JULIA ROTHSTEIN, DISABILITIES AND THE LAW 5
(Thomas Reuters, West 4th ed. 2009); see also Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S.
483 (1954).
24
Mills, 348 F. Supp. at 878.
25
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §§ 701–796 (2012).
19

410

Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary

34-2

prohibits federal entities from discriminating against people with
disabilities.26
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (Section 504) was
the first law to be enacted protecting persons with disabilities as it
exists today.27 It paved the way for the ADA and the IDEA.28
Section 504 applies to entities that receive federal funds; it prohibits
discrimination against people based on disabilities, stating:
No otherwise qualified individual with a disability in
the United States, as defined in section 705(20) of this
title, shall, solely by reason of his or her disability, be
excluded from the participation in, be denied the
benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any
program or activity receiving Federal financial
assistance . . . .29
Additionally, Section 504 requires employers to reasonably
accommodate employees with disabilities by making changes in
26

ROTHSTEIN & ROTHSTEIN, supra note 23, at 5. The 1973 Rehabilitation Act
consists of three major provisions: Section 501 mandates nondiscrimination and
affirmative action by federal employers.
Id.
Section 503 imposes
nondiscrimination and affirmative action in employment requirements for federal
contractors. Id. The most far-reaching and significant section is section 504. Id.
Section 504 applies to recipients of federal financial assistance, including education
programs, public facilities, transportation, and health and welfare services. Id. It
mandates nondiscrimination and reasonable accommodation and, until 1990, was
the most significant federal protection for individuals with disabilities. Id.
27
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2012). The statutory language
in section 794 first appeared in section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, and is
therefore referred to throughout this article as “Section 504.” Rehabilitation Act of
1973,
Pub.
L.
93–112,
87
Stat.
355,
available
at
https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=2&cad=rja
&uact=8&ved=0CCUQFjAB&url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww2.ed.gov%2Fpolicy%2
Fspeced%2Fleg%2Frehabact.doc&ei=S3K5VNnRHcTioATUqILgAw&usg=AFQj
CNE_9FKCxGz4jspmciV7TIy0mSIZ3Q&sig2=UY0L7LOArRrZNoI6Ye6O8A.
28
See Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2012).
29
29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (2012). The term “individual with a disability” is
defined as any individual who “(i) has a physical or mental impairment which for
such individual constitutes or results in a substantial impediment to employment;
and (ii) can benefit in terms of an employment outcome from vocational
rehabilitation services provided pursuant to subchapter I, III, or VI of this chapter.”
29 U.S.C. § 705 (20)(A) (2012).
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working conditions.30 In School Board of Nassau County v. Arline,31
“the United States Supreme Court noted that the purpose of the
Rehabilitation Act was to provide handicapped Americans with
opportunities for an education, transportation, housing, health care,
and jobs that other Americans take for granted.”32 After the
Rehabilitation Act was passed, President Richard Nixon designated
the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare as the agency to
coordinate the enforcement of the Act.33 When the Department of
Health, Education, and Welfare split into the Department of Health
and Human Services and the Department of Education in 1979, the
Department of Education took over the responsibility of enforcing
the provisions and preventing discrimination against people with
disabilities.34
The first major case to interpret Section 504 was Southeastern
Community College v. Davis.35 The Court determined that an
30

Ronald D. Wenkart, The Reasonable Accommodation Requirements of
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 62 ED. LAW REP. 11, 13 (1990).
31
480 U.S. 273, 275 (1987).
32
Wenkart, supra note 30, at 12.
33
Id. at 13.
34
Id.
35
Id. at 14; see also Se. Cmty. Coll. v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 400 (1979). The
respondent in this case suffered from a serious hearing disability and was denied
admission to Southeastern Community College’s Associate Degree Nursing
program (an institution that receives federal funds). Id. The Executive Director of
the North Carolina Board of Nursing recommended that the respondent not be
admitted because her hearing disability would make her unable to safely care for
patients. Id. at 401. After this evaluation and recommendation, the nursing staff of
Southeastern Community College voted to deny the respondent admission. Id. at
402.
Upon review of the respondent’s situation, the Court found that
Southeastern’s denial of admission was not discrimination, explaining that the
purpose of the program was to train persons to serve in the nursing profession in
customary ways. Id. at 403. It was undisputed that the respondent could not
qualify for this program unless the program’s standards were lowered, and
Southeastern is not required to lower standards to accommodate a person with a
disability. Id. at 413. An institution is not required to disregard disabilities or
make substantial changes in order to allow that person to participate. Id. The fact
that Southeastern was unwilling to make major adjustments to its program does not
constitute discrimination in this situation because the respondent was not an
otherwise qualified candidate—a person who is able to meet all of a program’s
requirements despite a handicap or disability. Id. at 406. Hearing was essential to
the nature of this program. Id. at 400–12.
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institution is not required to lower its standards or make substantial
modifications in a program such that a person with a disability can
participate.36 A government-funded institution, cannot, however,
discriminate against an otherwise qualified person solely by reason of
a disability.37 The cases that followed Southeastern38 established that
the reasonable accommodation requirements of Section 504 apply to
all special education students, as well as aids and equipment that may
assist these students and their parents.39
The reasonable
accommodation requirements do not require significant modification
or fundamental alteration of the educational program, “but where
accommodation is not financially or administratively burdensome,
modification of nonessential requirements that prevent persons with
disabilities from participating in the educational program must be
made.”40 Section 504 is still in effect today.41
B.

Americans with Disabilities Act

The ADA was signed into law by President George H. W. Bush
on July 26, 1990.42 The primary difference between Title II of the
ADA and Section 504 is that Section 504 only applies to entities that
receive federal funds, whereas the ADA applies to all public
institutions. Modeled after the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Section
504, the ADA was created in order to prohibit discrimination on the

36

Wenkart, supra note 30, at 15.
Id. at 14.
38
Id. at 16; see also Brookhart v. Ill. State Bd. of Educ., 697 F.2d 179, 183
(7th Cir. 1983); Colin K. v. Schmidt, 715 F.2d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 1983).
39
Wenkart, supra note 30, at 21.
40
Id.
41
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §§ 701–796 (2012).
42
INTRODUCTION TO THE ADA, http://www.ada.gov/ada_intro.htm (last visited
Dec. 30, 2014). At the time that the ADA was enacted, there were approximately
forty-three million Americans with physical or mental disabilities. ROTHSTEIN &
ROTHSTEIN, supra note 23, at 2. That number continues to increase as technology
and medicine advances, saving the lives of children with severe physical and
mental disabilities. Neal Halfon et al., The Changing Landscape of Disability in
Childhood, 22 THE FUTURE OF CHILDREN 1, 17 (2012), available at
http://futureofchildren.org/futureofchildren/publications/docs/22_01_FullJournal.p
df.
37
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basis of disability,43 to ensure that Americans with disabilities would
receive the same treatment as those without disabilities.44 The ADA
uses the same eligibility criteria as Section 504 to determine who
qualifies as disabled, and the ADA also affords the same protections
against discrimination as Section 504.45 The legislative intent of the
ADA was “to protect people, including children, with disabilities
from being excluded based upon overprotective rules, policies,
standards and criteria, and to provide these Americans with the
ability to redress such discrimination in federal court.”46 In order to
be protected under the ADA, one must have a disability as defined
under the terms of the Act:47
43

Scott B. Mac Lagan, Right of Access: How One Disability Law Enabled
Another, 26 TOURO L. REV. 735, 737 (2010); see also 42 U.S.C § 12101 (2012):
1. [T]o provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for
the elimination of discrimination against individuals with
disabilities;
2. [T]o provide clear, strong, consistent, enforceable standards
addressing discrimination against individuals with disabilities;
3. [T]o ensure that the Federal Government plays a central role in
enforcing the standards established in this chapter on behalf
of individuals with disabilities; and
4. [T]o invoke the sweep of congressional authority, including
the power to enforce the [F]ourteenth [A]mendment and to
regulate commerce, in order to address the major areas of
discrimination faced day-to-day by people with disabilities.
Id.
44
42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2012).
45
See Peter J. Maher, Caution on Exhaustion: The Courts’ Misinterpretation
of the IDEA’s Exhaustion Requirement for Claims Brought by Students Covered by
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA but not by the IDEA, 44 CONN.
L. REV. 259, 261 (2011).
46
Mac Lagan, supra note 43, at 738.
47
INTRODUCTION TO THE ADA, supra note 42; see also HOW TO COMPLY WITH
THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT: A GUIDE FOR RESTAURANTS AND OTHER
FOOD
SERVICE
EMPLOYERS,
http://www.eeoc.gov/facts/restaurant_guide_summary.html (last visited Dec. 30,
2014):
A person must have a serious, long-term medical condition or
disorder that makes it very difficult for him or her to do basic
activities. The person also must be qualified to perform the job.
This means that the person must have the education, experience
or skills necessary to do the job AND must be able to perform the
duties that are central to the job, with or without a reasonable
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The term disability means, with respect to an
individual:
(A) A physical or mental impairment that substantially
limits one or more major life activities of such
individual;
(B) a record of such an impairment; or
(C) being regarded as having such an impairment.48
The ADA prohibits discrimination against people with
disabilities, but does not guarantee the right to free appropriate public
education (FAPE), which is one of the primary objectives of the
IDEA.
C.

Individuals with Disabilities Education Act

For decades, students with disabilities were largely ignored, until
the enactment of the IDEA49—the first piece of legislation that
specifically addressed educating Americans with disabilities.50 The

accommodation.
Id.
48

42 U.S.C. § 12102(1) (2012). In general, “[‘]life activities’ include, but are
not limited to[:] caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, seeing, hearing,
eating, sleeping, walking, standing, lifting, bending, speaking, breathing, learning,
reading, concentrating, thinking, communicating, and working.” 42 U.S.C.
§12102(2)(A) (2012). Life activities also include “bodily functions,” including,
“but not limited to[:] functions of the immune system, normal cell growth,
digestive, bowel, bladder, neurological, brain, respiratory, circulatory, endocrine,
and reproductive functions.” 42 U.S.C. §12102(2)(B) (2012).
49
20 U.S.C. §§ 1400–1475 (2012).
50
Id.; see also Timothy E. Morse, Allan G. Osborne, Jr. & Charles J. Russo,
Ten Commandments of Special Education, 237 ED. LAW REP. 571, 572 (2008).
The Ten Commandments of Special Education are:
1. Be diligent in finding and identifying children with
disabilities
2. Provide children and their parents with all of the due process
that is due
3. Thoroughly and timely evaluate all children with suspected
disabilities
4. Include parents as equal partners in the development of the
IEP
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first form of the IDEA was created in 1970 with the Education of the
Handicapped Act, which was later reauthorized as the Education for
All Handicapped Children Act of 1975 (EAHCA).51 Congress
recognized that the educational needs of children with disabilities
were not being met because:
(1) the children did not receive appropriate
educational services;
(2) the children were excluded entirely from the public
school system and from being educated with their
peers;
(3) undiagnosed disabilities prevented the children
from having a successful educational experience; and
(4) a lack of adequate resources within the public
school system forced families to find services outside
the public school system.52
The EAHCA was reauthorized as the IDEA and was most
recently reauthorized as the Individuals with Disabilities Education
Improvement Act of 2004 (IDEIA).53 Throughout the various forms
of this Act, the purpose has remained to provide students with
disabilities access to learning in schools.54 The IDEA definition of
“disability,” as it exists today, is divided into two sections; the first
5. Make sure that the IEP is reasonably designed to provide
educational benefit
6. Include any necessary related services, assistive technology,
and transition services
7. Provide all programs and services in the least restrictive
environment
8. Review all IEPs at least annually and reevaluate children at
least every three years
9. Act promptly to resolve disputes
10. Keep accurate records
Id. at 571–78.
51
Mac Lagan, supra note 43, at 740.
52
Kathryn M. Smith & Richard Bales, Education for Americans with
Disabilities: Reconciling IDEA with the 2008 ADA Amendments, 37 N. KY. L. REV.
389, 391 (2010).
53
Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act of 2004, 20 U.S.C.
§§ 1400–1475 (2012); see also Mac Lagan, supra note 43.
54
Mac Lagan, supra note 43, at 740.
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section defines “child with a disability” generally as a child:
with intellectual disabilities, hearing impairments
(including deafness), speech or language impairments,
visual impairments (including blindness), serious
emotional disturbance (referred to in this chapter as
“emotional disturbance”), orthopedic impairments,
autism, traumatic brain injury, other health
impairments, or specific learning disabilities; and
who, by reason thereof, needs special education and
related services.55
The second section explains that disability as it pertains to
children ages three to nine could, at the discretion of the State and
local education agency, include a child “experiencing developmental
delays, as defined by the State and as measured by appropriate
diagnostic instruments and procedures, in [one] or more of the
following areas: physical development; cognitive development;
communication development; social or emotional development; or
adaptive development; and who, by reason thereof, needs special
education and related services.”56 The IDEA provides federal
funding from the Department of Education to provide for students
with special education needs,57 but leaves the responsibility for
developing and executing programs for children who qualify for
assistance to the states.58 All public schools must comply with the
IDEA.59 In addition to funding special education, the IDEA gives
disabled students an “enforceable substantive right to public
education.”60 But in order for a child to be protected under the

55

20 U.S.C. § 1401(3)(A) (2012); see also William D. Goren, Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act: The Interrelationship to the ADA and Preventative
Law, 71 FLA. B.J. 76, 79 (1997).
56
20 U.S.C. § 1401(3)(B) (2012).
57
ROTHSTEIN & ROTHSTEIN, supra note 23, at 70.
58
78A CORPUS JURIS SECUNDUM 262 (Joseph J. Bassano et al. eds., 2008).
“Congress has enacted the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, which
provides federal money to assist state and local agencies in educating disabled
children.” Id.
59
Id.
60
Id. at 263; see also Steven Marchese, Putting Square Pegs into Round
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IDEA, the child must suffer an adverse effect on his or her academic
achievement as a result of the defined disability.61
The first Supreme Court case to discuss the concept of FAPE was
Board of Education v. Rowley.62 Rowley addressed the issue of
whether the IDEA required a school to provide a sign language
interpreter to a deaf child.63 The Court ruled that if a state has
complied with the procedural requirements of the IDEA and the
individualized education program (IEP) developed through the Act’s
procedures is “reasonably calculated to enable the child to receive
educational benefits,” then the state has complied with its obligations
under the IDEA.64 The Court further held that “[t]he Act does not
require a State to maximize the potential of each handicapped child
commensurate with the opportunity provided nonhandicapped
children,”65 but it does require the state to provide FAPE to qualified
students with disabilities to tailor to their individual needs so that the
students can advance from grade to grade.66 The Supreme Court
Holes: Mediation and the Rights of Children with Disabilities Under the IDEA, 53
RUTGERS L. REV. 333, 335 (2001) (explaining that “the emphasis of the statute is
on procedure—with detailed requirements to ensure parental participation in the
initial evaluation and development of a child's educational plan, as well as a
complex due process system to resolve disputes between parents, guardians, and
the school district if an initial agreement is not possible.”).
61
CORPUS JURIS SECUNDUM, supra note 58, at 263.
62
458 U.S. 176, 179 (1982). Justice Rehnquist held that (1) FAPE is satisfied
when the state provides personalized instruction that permits the child with a
disability to benefit from that personalized instruction, (2) FAPE does not require a
state to maximize the potential of each child with a disability, and (3) in light of
finding that a deaf child was advancing easily from grade to grade, the EAHCA did
not require that the school provide the child with a sign-language interpreter. Id. at
209–10.
63
Id. at 184–85.
64
Id. at 206–07.
65
Id. at 177.
66
Id. This decision can be read in different ways. A narrow understanding of
the Rowley decision can be read to say that the IDEA requires that public entities
provide an equal opportunity to benefit from a public education, not make any
guarantees on their success once provided these opportunities. A more expansive
view of the Rowley decision would show that the Court specifically refrained from
establishing a test and instead conducted a case-specific analysis to determine if the
educational benefits were adequate. This remains a controversial ruling:
In addition to its contentious minimal educational standard, there
is confusion among the circuits and commentators as to Rowley's
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stated that under IDEA, a “free appropriate public education” means
special education and related services that: “(A) have been provided
at public expense, under public supervision and direction, and
without charge, (B) meet the standards of the State educational
agency, (C) include an appropriate preschool, elementary, or
secondary school education in the State involved, and (D) are
provided in conformity [with the IEP].”67
The Act requires “specially defined instruction, and related
services, at no cost to parents, to meet the unique needs of a child
with a disability.”68 The IDEA requires that the state provide these
services to students with disabilities from the ages of three to twentytwo, or until the student graduates high school—whichever happens
first.69 The IDEA also specifies certain factors that must be
considered for students that have particular disabilities.70 After it is
determined that a student has a disability and that the disability
interferes with the student’s education, an IEP is prepared, which is
an individualized written statement that defines the services that will
be provided to the student.71 The required components of the IEP

application. For example, there is a circuit split regarding what
constitutes the “educational benefit” portion of Rowley's FAPE
definition. Six circuits require the benefit to be meaningful, five
require the benefit to merely be adequate or provide some
benefit, and one uses a combination of both.
David G. King, Van Duyn v. Baker School District: A “Material” Improvement in
Evaluating a School District’s Failure to Implement Individualized Education
Programs, 4 NW. J. L. & SOC. POL’Y 457, 461–62 (2009).
67
Goren, supra note 55, at 79. In Rowley, Justice Rehnquist further stated,
“[I]f personalized instruction is being provided with sufficient supportive services
to permit the child to benefit from the instruction, and the other items on the
definitional checklist are satisfied, the child is receiving a ‘free appropriate public
education’ as defined by the Act.” 458 U.S. at 189.
68
Mac Taylor, Overview of Special Education in California (Jan. 3, 2013),
available at http://www.lao.ca.gov/reports/2013/edu/special-ed-primer/special-edprimer-010313.pdf.
69
Id. at 5.
70
K.M. ex rel. Bright v. Tustin Unified Sch. Dist., 725 F.3d 1088, 1095 (9th
Cir. 2013), cert. denied 134 S.Ct. 1493 (2014), cert. denied 134 S.Ct. 1494 (2014).
In this case, which will be discussed in detail in Part III of this comment, the court
discussed certain factors that must be considered for deaf or hard-of-hearing
(DHH) students. Id.
71
Taylor, supra note 68, at 8.
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include current status, goals, progress measures, services to be
provided, inclusion in mainstream setting, an assessment plan, and
any additional considerations.72 The purpose of an IEP is to have an
education program that addresses each child’s specific needs so that
the child can receive an appropriate education.73 The goal of an IEP
is a cooperative process between the district and the parents of the
child with special education needs.74
The Supreme Court in Rowley next addressed whether Congress
intended education of students with disabilities to meet a substantive
standard, and looked to legislative history to answer this question.75
Support for the education of students with disabilities was relatively
recent; therefore, the goals of recent legislation at that time had not
been overly ambitious, with the primary intent of making education
available to students with disabilities, and without the expectation of
any particular outcome.76 The Court took note of the fact that the
courts in PARC and Mills discussed the legislative reports at length in
their respective decisions.77 This suggested that the principles
72

Id. at 9. An IEP “team” is also required. Wilkins v. District of Columbia,
571 F. Supp. 2d 163, 167 (D.D.C. 2008). The team is composed of the parents of
the child with a disability, a regular education teacher, a special education teacher,
a school district representative, an individual who can interpret the student’s
evaluation results, sometimes a person with particular knowledge of the student,
and sometimes, the student herself. Id.; see also 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(B) (2012).
73
CORPUS JURIS SECUNDUM, supra note 58, at 266–67. More specifically, in
Rowley, the Court said that an IEP must contain:
(A) a statement of the present levels of educational performance
of such child, (B) a statement of annual goals, including shortterm instructional objectives, (C) a statement of the specific
educational services to be provided to such child, and the extent
to which such child will be able to participate in regular
educational programs, (D) the projected date for initiation and
anticipated duration of such services, and (E) appropriate
objective criteria and evaluation procedures and schedules for
determining, on at least an annual basis, whether instructional
objectives are being achieved.
458 U.S. 176, 182 (1982).
74
Schaffer ex rel. Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49, 53 (2005).
75
Rowley, 458 U.S. at 190.
76
Id. at 191–92. “Thus, the intent of the Act was more to open the door of
public education to handicapped children on appropriate terms than to guarantee
any particular level of education once inside.” Id. at 192.
77
Id. at 193.
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established in those two cases were principles that guided the drafters
of the Act.78 The Court explained that, considering the Act together
with the legislative history, congressional intent was to provide
access to education for students with disabilities so that they may
advance from grade to grade,79 but did not require any substantive
level of education.80
III.
A.

K.M. EX REL. BRIGHT
Facts of the Case

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals case, K.M. ex rel. Bright,
addressed the issue regarding the interrelationship between the IDEA
and the ADA.81 This case, decided in August 2013, consolidated two
California cases, which both addressed public schools’ obligations to
deaf or hard-of-hearing (DHH) students.82

78

Id. at 194. The 1974 statute:
“incorporated the major principles of the right to education
cases,” by “add[ing] important new provisions to the Education of
the Handicapped Act[,] which require the States to: establish a
goal of providing full educational opportunities to all handicapped
children; provide procedures for insuring that handicapped
children and their parents or guardians are guaranteed procedural
safeguards in decisions regarding identification, evaluation, and
educational placement of handicapped children; establish
procedures to insure that, to the maximum extent appropriate,
handicapped children . . . are educated with children who are not
handicapped; . . . and, establish procedures to insure that testing
and evaluation materials and procedures utilized for the purposes
of classification and placement of handicapped children will be
selected and administered so as not to be racially or culturally
discriminatory.”
Id. at n.18. This made it clear that the purpose of the Act was access, not
substantive outcomes or achievement.
79
Id. at 203–04.
80
Id.
81
K.M. ex rel. Bright v. Tustin Unified Sch. Dist., 725 F.3d 1088, 1092 (9th
Cir. 2013), cert. denied 134 S.Ct. 1493 (2014), cert. denied 134 S.Ct. 1494 (2014).
82
Id.
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The first plaintiff, K.M., was a high school student in the Tustin
Unified School District (Tustin) in Orange County, California.83
K.M. had a hearing disability, causing her to have trouble hearing her
classmates, as well as difficulty hearing videos that were shown in
the classroom.84 Tustin had regular meetings to develop K.M.’s IEP,
and at a June 2009 meeting of K.M.’s IEP team, K.M.’s mother
requested that Tustin provide her with Communication Access
Realtime Translation (CART) beginning on the first day of high
school.85 After several meetings and trials of both CART and an
alternative transcription technology called TypeWell, K.M.’s IEP
team determined that K.M. did not need a transcription service in
order to receive FAPE under the IDEA.86
The second plaintiff, D.H., was a high school student in the
Poway Unified School District (Poway) in San Diego County,
California.87 Like K.M., D.H. also had a hearing disability and was
eligible to receive special education services under the IDEA.88
D.H.’s hearing disability caused her to have difficulty following class
discussions and teacher instructions, a problem that continued after
she started high school.89 Like in K.M.’s case, at an IEP meeting,
D.H.’s parents requested that Poway provide her with CART, and the
IEP team determined that CART was not necessary in order to
provide D.H. with FAPE under the IDEA.90
D.H. and K.M. both had hearings before a California
administrative law judge (ALJ), who determined that their respective
districts had fulfilled their obligations to D.H. and K.M. under the
IDEA.91 D.H. and K.M. challenged their respective ALJ decisions in

83

Id.
Id. at 1093.
85
Id. at 1092. “CART is a word-for-word transcription service, similar to
court reporting, in which a trained stenographer provides real-time captioning that
appears on a computer monitor.” Id. CART was a service that was recommended
by K.M.’s auditory-visual therapist. Id. at 1093.
86
Id.
87
Id. at 1092.
88
Id. at 1094.
89
Id.
90
Id.
91
Id. at 1092.
84
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district court, alleging disability discrimination.92 The plaintiffs
conceded that their respective districts and schools complied with the
IDEA; they challenged only the validity of their ADA claims.93
Thus, the specific issue addressed was “whether a school district’s
compliance with its obligations to a [DHH] child under the IDEA
also necessarily establishes compliance with its effective
communication obligations to that child under Title II of the ADA.”94
B.

Ninth Circuit Holding

The court held that “[t]he failure of an IDEA claim does not
automatically foreclose a[n ADA] Title II claim grounded in the
[ADA] Title II effective communications regulation,”95 determining
that compliance with one act is not necessarily compliance with the
other, and that one act does not have primacy over the other.96

92

Id. K.M. challenged the ALJ decision under the IDEA, Section 504, the
ADA, and California’s Unruh Civil Rights Act. Id. at 1093. D.H. challenged the
ALJ decision under Section 504, the ADA, and the IDEA. Id. at 1094.
93
Id. at 1092.
94
Id.
95
Id. at 1102. The court of appeals decided not to review the record to
determine whether there was an alternate ground on which to affirm summary
judgment. Id. Because both districts on the original cases granted summary
judgment on legal grounds, “neither district court considered whether there was a
genuine issue of material fact as to the school districts’ compliance with [ADA]
Title II.” Id. at 1103. Furthermore, the school districts litigated these cases as if
the IDEA and ADA claims were equivalent. Id. As the court explains in footnote
seven of this case, “Although [the school districts] made [ADA] Title II-specific
arguments in the alternative, the IDEA claims were clearly the focus of their
litigation efforts.” Id. at n.7. The court of appeals reversed the grants of summary
judgment on the ADA claims in both cases and remanded to the district courts for
further proceedings. Id. at 1103. The United States District, S.D. received D.H.’s
case on remand, and the court ordered the Poway District to provide D.H. with
CART during classes at school. D.H. ex rel. Harrington v. Poway Unified Sch.
Dist., No. 09–CV–2621–L, 2013 WL 6730163, at *8 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 19, 2013).
Poway moved for reconsideration of the preliminary injunction granted by the S.D.
court on remand; the court denied Poway’s motion for reconsideration. D.H. ex
rel. Harrington v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., No. 09–CV–2621–L, 2014 WL
129070, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 14, 2014). K.M.’s case has not yet been heard on
remand.
96
K.M. ex rel. Bright, 725 F.3d at 1102.
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Addressing both K.M.’s and D.H.’s decisions together, the court
of appeals acknowledged that, at least generally, schools are required
to comply with both the ADA and the IDEA, but that they differ in
their ends as well as their means:97
Substantively, the IDEA sets only a floor of access to
education for children with communications
disabilities, but requires school districts to provide the
individualized services necessary to get a child to that
floor, regardless of the costs, administrative burdens,
or program alterations required. [ADA] Title II and
its implementing regulations, taken together, require
public entities to take steps towards making existing
services not just accessible, but equally accessible to
people with communication disabilities, but only
insofar as doing so does not pose an undue burden or
require a fundamental alteration of their programs.98
But the Ninth Circuit suggested that Congress intended for these
two pieces of legislation to coexist.99 The court in K.M. ex rel.
Bright specifically clarified that the IDEA does not foreclose any
additional claims children with disabilities may have through other
legislation, so long as they address their IDEA claims through the
specified IDEA administrative procedure.100

97

Id. at 1097.
Id.
99
Id.
100
Id. The IDEA non-exclusivity provision reads:
Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to restrict or limit the
rights, procedures, and remedies available under the Constitution,
the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 [42 U.S.C. § 12101
et seq.], title V of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 [29 U.S.C. §
791 et seq.], or other Federal laws protecting the rights of
children with disabilities, except that before the filing of a civil
action under such laws seeking relief that is also available under
this subchapter, the procedures under subsections (f) and (g) shall
be exhausted to the same extent as would be required had the
action been brought under this subchapter.
Id. (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1415(l) (2012)).
98
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Specifically with respect to DHH children, the court looked at the
language of the communication provisions contained in the ADA and
the IDEA,101 which was an issue of first impression for the court.102
In comparing the communication provisions in these two pieces of
legislation, the court of appeals identified three significant
differences.103 First, the factors that schools must consider when
evaluating students with hearing problems under the IDEA and the
ADA are different.104 When evaluating an IEP for IDEA purposes,
the IEP team must focus on the child’s “needs” and “opportunities,”
considering factors including “the child’s language and
communication needs,” “opportunities for direct communications
with peers and professional personnel in the child’s language and
communication mode,” and “whether the child needs assistive
technology devices and services.”105 However, under the ADA, the
school, as a public entity, is required to “furnish appropriate auxiliary
aids and services where necessary.”106 As the court of appeals
explains, the ADA includes another requirement that the public entity
“give primary consideration to the requests of the individual with
disabilities.”107 This provision in the ADA, the court of appeals
pointed out, has no IDEA counterpart.108
Second, the ADA provides schools and districts with defenses
that are not available under the IDEA.109 The ADA does not require
public entities to make any changes that would fundamentally alter
the nature of a service, program, or activity.110 It does not require a
public entity to make changes that would pose an undue financial or
administrative burden.111 The ADA also does not require a school to
provide new programs or new curricula to accommodate a child with

101

Id. at 1100.
Id.
103
Id.
104
Id.
105
Id.
106
Id.
107
Id. at 1100–01 (citing 28 C.F.R. § 35.160(b)(2) (2014)).
108
Id. at 1100.
109
Id. at 1101.
110
Id.
111
Id.
102
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a disability.112 These ADA defenses have no IDEA counterpart.113
Under the IDEA, the school district must do whatever is necessary to
ensure that a child with special needs advances from grade to
grade.114
Third, the ADA requires schools to provide equal education
opportunities to all students, which is a requirement that is not
relevant to IDEA claims.115 Given these differences, the court
reasoned that it was not possible to determine a unified theory for the
interaction between the ADA and the IDEA.116 Both cases were
remanded for further proceedings consistent with the Ninth Circuit
opinion.117
By ruling that K.M. and D.H. could litigate their claims under the
ADA after their IDEA claims failed, the court presented an important
question about the relationship between the IDEA and the ADA, but
was unable to provide comprehensive guidance regarding how other
courts should handle claims brought under both acts. The court
acknowledged that it was speaking specifically about the issues
facing DHH students and that the relationship between the IDEA and
the ADA was a matter that had to be evaluated on a case-by-case
basis.118 However, the general interaction of the IDEA and the ADA
is a critical issue to resolve in order to ensure that the needs of
students with disabilities in California are being properly evaluated
and addressed.
C.

Analyzing the Ninth Circuit’s Holding

In K.M. ex rel. Bright, K.M. and D.H. were both DHH
students,119 and both students were arguing for CART under the
ADA, not the IDEA, even though they requested CART for
educational purposes.120 At first glance, the outright failure of their
112

Id.
See generally 20 U.S.C. § 1400 (2012).
114
Id.
115
K.M. ex rel. Bright, 725 F.3d at 1101.
116
Id.
117
Id. at 1103.
118
Id. at 1101.
119
See supra Part III.A.
120
See supra Part III.A.
113
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IDEA claims is counterintuitive because these students did not
receive the services that they believed would help them perform
better in school. Even though the IDEA claims were not successful
for D.H. and K.M., the IDEA does more to protect their educational
interests than the ADA, as the ADA does not speak specifically to
education. The existence of an IEP under the requirements of the
IDEA ensures that students’ needs are being considered on an
individual basis, whereas the ADA ensures only that individuals are
not discriminated against for reason of disability.121 It is true that the
definition of “disability” is broader under the ADA,122 so at face
value, the ADA would appear more beneficial for special education
students. However, as previously mentioned, it is also true that the
ADA does not require public entities to fundamentally alter an
existing institution or system, or put themselves at financial risk in
order to accommodate a student with a disability.123 The IDEA, on
the other hand, must accommodate a student with a disability to a
certain extent regardless of the cost to the school or to the district.124
By this reasoning, the district courts in K.M.’s and D.H.’s respective
cases were right to conclude that compliance with the IDEA results
in compliance with the ADA.
IV.
A.

EDUCATION IN CALIFORNIA
General Education in California

I have chosen California to evaluate this issue of the
interrelationship of the ADA and the IDEA because California is
known for its frequent changes in education policy, and therefore has
the potential to set an example for model legislation in other states.125

121

See supra Part II.
See infra Part V.
123
See supra Part II.
124
See supra Part II.
125
PACE, Californians and Public Education: Results from the Fourth
PACE/USC
Rossier
Poll
1
(Nov.
2014),
http://www.edpolicyinca.org/sites/default/files/PACE%20USC%20Poll%20Nov%
202014.pdf.
122
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California is a state that is willing to adapt and grow as the education
system continues to develop through laws and procedure.126
It is important to have some context for understanding how
special education operates within California’s broader education
system. California has the largest population of any state in the
country, and consequently also has the largest population of students
of any state in the country, placing a greater strain on California’s
education system in a number of ways.127 In the 2010–2011 school
year, the student-to-teacher ratio in California was 24.1:1, compared
to 16:1 nationally, ranking California forty-ninth out of fifty-one
(fifty states and the District of Columbia) in student-to-teacher
ratio.128 The student-to-administrator ratio in California was 333.7:1,
compared to 215.5:1 nationally, ranking California forty-eighth in the
country in student-to-administrator ratio.129 In 2013, California
dropped to forty-ninth in per student spending in the nation, spending
$8,482 per student, which is $3,342—or 28%—below the national
average of $12,842 per student.130 Based on these numbers, it is
clear that one of California’s biggest problems is the lack of
professional adults—especially teachers—in the system to serve the
sheer number of students in California.131
126
127

Id.

PACE,
Reforming
Education
in
California
7
(2010),
http://edpolicyinca.org/sites/default/files/2010_REFORMING_ED_IN_CA_WEB.
pdf (last visited Dec. 30, 2014).
128
Patrick Keaton, Public Elementary and Secondary School Student
Enrollment and Staff Counts from the Common Core of Data: School Year 2010–
11, NATIONAL CENTER FOR EDUCATION STATISTICS 14 (Apr. 2012),
http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2012/2012327.pdf.
129
Id.
130
John Fensterwald, California Drops to 49th in School Spending in Annual
Ed
Week
Report,
ED
SOURCE
(Jan.
14,
2013),
http://edsource.org/today/2013/california-drops-to-49th-in-school-spending-inannual-ed-week-report/25379#.UwlqmhbbdUT.
131
Id. California also has a unique student body:
California educates approximately one-third of the nation’s
English language learners, more than three-quarters of whom are
Spanish-speaking. More than [forty] percent of California’s
public school children speak a first language other than English.
English language learners face significant challenges beyond
those faced by native English speakers. The majority of these
students are living in poverty with parents who have very little
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The volume of students in the system places a huge strain on the
resources available to the California education system,132 without yet
taking into account the additional resources required to run special
education programs in California or the special needs of students
with disabilities. The shortage of teachers and other professional
personnel is particularly prevalent in high-need areas.133 High-need
schools face the challenge of attracting and retaining high-quality,
experienced teachers, which is problematic in that teacher turnover
has a high impact on student achievement and success.134
Additionally, areas with high turnover rates lose money in teacher
professional development.135
The independent, nonpartisan research center, Policy Analysis for
California Education (PACE), determined that the education system
in California is more dependent on state funding than almost every
other state in the country,136 making education finance an issue
education. They require teachers with special skills, as they
need to learn both a new language and the academic
curriculum. California faces a severe shortage of teachers with
these skills.
Id. at 3.
132
Id. at 4.
133
Id. at 3–4. The term “high-need” refers to areas with high poverty rates and
low Academic Performance Index (API) scores. Id. API measures the progress of
the school itself, as opposed to the progress of the individual students. Id. at 4–7.
134
Id. It is widely acknowledged that “[t]eachers are the single most important
influence on the education of students.” Id. at 6. Additionally, “compensation . . .
represents the largest share of the state’s education budget.” Id. Some argue that
more effective use of the state’s education budget through “eliminating perverse
incentives, increasing local flexibility and innovation, and encouraging
experimentation with alternative approaches to recruitment, retention, and
compensation would better equip California’s schools to find and retain teachers
who can ensure success for all of their students, especially those facing the biggest
challenges.” Id. at 6.
135
Id. at 3.
136
Id. at 15. California is more dependent on state funding than most other
states, and the state’s finance system itself is very complicated:
[T]he state’s system of finance is so complex that only a handful
of experts understand how California’s schools are financed.
This complexity imposes costs without providing benefits to the
education system. California would gain from policies that
increase transparency and flexibility in funding. Increased
flexibility would enable districts and schools to direct funds to
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primarily for state and local agencies.137 However, similar to most
other states, California’s system of education is fraught with
inequalities in the money and resources available to different schools
and school districts across the state.138 It is clear that reforming and
improving California’s education system in general will require a
great deal more funding.139 California’s greatest concern is the lack
of funds to provide both regular students and special education
students with the tools and resources they need to be successful.
General funding principles in California affect how California
evaluates and regulates special education, and has a big impact on
how courts will likely view the interrelationship between the ADA
and the IDEA.
B.

Special Education in California

Special education in California operates differently than general
education in California, affecting how the courts must view the IDEA
and the ADA. In order to receive special education, the student must
have a disability and the disability must interfere with his or her
education.140 A student is not qualified to receive special services
until the school has tried to meet the student’s needs within the
parameters of the system as it exists for students without
disabilities.141 After it is determined that the school cannot meet the
student’s needs in the general education program, the student is
referred for a professional evaluation of his or her disability to see if
he or she is qualified for special education.142 At the beginning of
2013, approximately 686,000 students with disabilities received
special education services in the state of California,143 which is
approximately 10% of the students in the public education system in
meet local needs, and to avoid the costs of compliance with
today’s complex funding rules.
Id.
137

Id.
Id.
139
Id.
140
Taylor, supra note 68, at 8.
141
Id.
142
Id.
143
Id. at 9.
138
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the state.144 About 618,000 of these students are in grades
kindergarten through twelfth grade.145 In California, 41% of students
with disabilities have specific learning disabilities, “affecting one or
more of the basic processes involved in understanding/using
language or performing mathematical calculations.”146 Speech or
language disabilities affect approximately 25% of students with
disabilities in California, and autism affects approximately 10% of
students with disabilities in California.147 Over the past few decades,
the number of students identified with specific learning disabilities

144

Id.; see also Special Education CalEd Facts, DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION
CALIFORNIA, available at http://www.cde.ca.gov/sp/se/sr/cefspeced.asp (last
visited Dec. 30, 2014):
Intellectual disabilities: 43,303
Speech or language impairment: 164,600
Visual impairment: 4,327
Emotional disturbance: 25,984
Orthopedic impairment: 14,261
Other health impairment: 61,309
Specific learning disability: 278,697
Deafness: 3,946
Hard of hearing: 9,991
Deaf-blindness: 160
Multiple disabilities: 5,643
Autism: 71,825
Traumatic brain injury: 1,771
Id.
145
Taylor, supra note 68, at 9.
146
Id. at 9; see also Department of Education, Specific Learning Disability,
available at http://doe.sd.gov/oess/documents/sped_RtI_eligibility.pdf (last visited
Dec. 30, 2014):
Specific learning disability is a disorder in one or more of the
basic psychological processes involved in understanding or in
using spoken or written language that may manifest itself in the
imperfect ability to listen, think, speak, read, write, spell, or do
mathematical calculations. The term includes such conditions as
perceptual disabilities, brain injury, minimal brain dysfunction,
dyslexia, and developmental aphasia. The term does not apply to
students who have learning problems that are primarily the result
of visual, hearing, or motor disabilities; cognitive disability;
emotional disturbance; or environmental, cultural, or economic
disadvantage.
Id.
147
Taylor, supra note 68, at 9.
OF
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has dropped, while the overall number of students with disabilities
has significantly increased.148 The report, Overview of Special
Education in California, generated by the California Legislative
Analyst’s Office, states that this is a general trend that is reflected
across the nation, demonstrating the need for a unified theory
regarding the relationship between the ADA and the IDEA
nationwide.149
The most common service provided for students with special
education needs is specialized academic instruction.150 The next
largest category of service provided is speech and language
therapy—over 300,000 students receive this service.151 Other
services include occupational therapy, counseling services,
interpreting services, and physical therapy.152 Additionally, schools
are required to develop specific services for students once they reach
the age of sixteen in order to prepare them to transition into
postsecondary activities.153 These services include, “vocational and
career readiness activities, college counseling, and training in
independent living skills.”154 In addition to procedural requirements,
federal law provides parents with the right to challenge the specific

148

Id. at 10.
Id.
150
Id. at 11.
151
Id. “Speech-language pathology services” is defined as:
I. Identification of children with speech or language
impairments;
II. Diagnosis and appraisal of specific speech or language
impairments;
III. Referral for medical or other professional attention necessary
for the habilitation of speech or language impairments;
IV. Provision of speech and language services for the
habilitation or prevention of communicative impairments;
and
V. Counseling and guidance of parents, children, and teachers
regarding speech andlanguage impairments.
34 C.F.R. § 300.34 (c)(15) (2014).
152
34 C.F.R. § 300.34 (c) (2014).
153
Taylor, supra note 68, at 11.
154
Id.
149
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services that their children receive.155
In California, special education funding is administered through
127 Special Education Local Plan Areas (SELPAs) rather than
through the districts in the state.156 SELPAs are composed of
districts, county offices of education, and charter schools, which all
have unique organizational and operating structures.157 In California,
the average cost of providing for a student with disabilities as
compared to a student without disabilities is more than double—
$22,300 compared to $9,600.158 The additional funds are supported
by “an average of about $2,300 in federal funds, about $5,400 in state
funds, and about $5,000 in local funds.”159 Excess costs to support
special education in California have increased over the past several
years, in part due to more students with severe disabilities.160
Special education in California is funded using a census-funding
model, which means that the amount of state aid is determined based
primarily on the number of students enrolled in the district and the
amount of aid is fixed per student:161
Census funding differs from all other methods used by
states for distributing special education funds because
aid is largely independent of the characteristics of
special education programs, such as the number of
students served. . . . States adopting census funding
limited their fiscal exposure to rising disability rates
by ceasing to provide aid based on factors that
districts arguably can influence (e.g., the number of
students identified, the nature of their disabilities, how
students are served across educational environments,
or the resources committed to helping each student),
155

See, e.g., note 92 and accompanying text.
Taylor, supra note 68, at 5.
157
Id.
158
Id. at 6.
159
Id. at 14.
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Id. at 15–16.
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Elizabeth Dhuey, Funding Special Education by Total District Enrollment:
Advantages, Disadvantages, and Policy Considerations 5, available at
http://homes.chass.utoronto.ca/~edhuey/datastore/files/docs/EFP_policy_brief_Dhu
ey_Lipscomb_Jan_21_2013.pdf (last visited Dec. 30, 2014).
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thus forcing school districts to assume more fiscal
responsibility for additional special education
services.162
In applying this model, California assumes additional costs to meet
special education needs, and funding for special education is
distributed based on total enrollment instead of special education
enrollment specifically.163
The census-funding model has its
advantages and disadvantages.164 One advantage is that it is a
transparent formula for calculating funding—it is purely based on
enrollment.165 Because school districts know how their funding is
being calculated, they are able to make plans to effectively use their
funding. The ability of school districts to know, more or less, how
much money they will be receiving is a huge advantage given
California’s already scarce resources for the large population of
students district to district.166 Another major advantage is that census
funding also lowers the incentive to over-identify disabilities in order
to receive more funding because the amount of funding is based on
enrollment of students as a whole, not only on the students with
recognized disabilities.167
However, this model also has its
disadvantages. One disadvantage is that the census-funding model
does not consider the actual number of students with disabilities per
district and instead assumes uniformity of additional costs to meet the
needs of special education students.168 Studies assessing the special
education needs across a state have flatly rejected the idea of
uniformity across a state.169
Based on the numbers discussed above, it is clear that one of
California’s greatest issues in education is the lack of funding and
resources to provide for all of the students in the system. The ADA
and the IDEA impose standards on California schools, and
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Id. at 5–6.
Id. at 9–10.
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Id. at 9.
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Id. at 9–10.
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Id. at 10.
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compliance with these standards has a direct relationship to available
funding and resources. Furthermore, access to education provided by
the IDEA requires schools to spend more money on students with
disabilities than on the average student.170 The more obligations
schools have to a student, the more funding schools need to fulfill
their federal obligations to special education students. California is
likely expending resources just to account for the disparity in the
relationship between these two acts. In order to cope with an already
overtaxed system, courts need to have one clear, cost-effective
compliance standard for California districts and schools.
V.

A.

THE IDEA SHOULD HAVE PRIMACY OVER THE ADA IN
SPECIAL EDUCATION
Comparing the Purposes of the ADA and the IDEA

While the Ninth Circuit held that compliance with the IDEA does
not automatically guarantee compliance with the ADA, it is
important to assess how the ADA and the IDEA differ and what these
differences mean for school districts. The goals of the ADA and the
IDEA are similar in that they both aim to protect the rights of
individuals with disabilities; however, they have noticeable and
measurable differences: “The ADA's goal of enabling people with
disabilities to receive the same opportunities as people without
disabilities is distinct from the IDEA's goal of enabling students with
disabilities to receive the same educational opportunities as
nondisabled students.”171 There are educational and noneducational
distinctions between the ADA and the IDEA. The difference in
purpose between the ADA and the IDEA, at its most basic level, is
that the former piece of legislation deals with providing people with
disabilities the same opportunities, while the latter deals specifically
with providing people with disabilities the same educational
opportunities as those without disabilities.172 Due to this distinction,
they have different definitions for what qualifies as a disability.
170

PACE, supra note 127, at 2. In 2006–2007, spending on special education
students in California was 140% higher than spending for regular education
students. Dhuey, supra note 161, at 3 n.4.
171
Mac Lagan, supra note 43, at 743.
172
Id. at 740.
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As discussed below, the ADA definition continues to broaden
with each reauthorization,173 whereas the IDEA definition continues
to narrow.174 A broader ADA definition that defines disability as a
physical or mental impairment limiting a major life activity
incorporates more individuals with disabilities under the Act, but
moves even further away from a focus on education.175 In contrast, a
narrower IDEA definition focuses more purposefully on disabilities
that affect education, such as hearing impairments, autism, and
specific learning disabilities.176
In addition, with a definition of disability that focuses more
specifically on education, the IDEA has more extensive procedural
requirements than the ADA.177 The IDEA sets a standard for access
to education and requires school districts to ensure that students with
disabilities meet that standard of access through individualized
programs regardless of the cost or administrative burden it takes to
make that happen.178 In contrast, the ADA requires school districts
to make existing services equally accessible, but only so far as it does
not unnecessarily burden or alter the existing programs.179 This
distinction demonstrates that the goal of the IDEA is access to
education, whereas the goal of the ADA is preventing general
discrimination based on disability. Due to their differing goals, the
IDEA’s obligations to students are different than the ADA’s
obligations to students. For example, under Title II of the ADA, a
public school must provide DHH students with communications that
are as effective as the communications that are provided for
individuals without a disability.180 Under the IDEA, a school must
provide each individual DHH student with a specific education
173

See infra Part V.B.
See infra Part V.B.
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See supra Part II.C.
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See supra Part II.B.
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K.M. ex rel. Bright v. Tustin Unified Sch. Dist., 725 F.3d 1088, 1096 (9th
Cir. 2013), cert. denied 134 S.Ct. 1493 (2014), cert. denied 134 S.Ct. 1494 (2014).
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Id. at 1097.
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Brief for the Appellant as Amicus Curiae, Department of Justice at 10,
K.M. ex rel. Bright v. Tustin Unified Sch. Dist., 725 F.3d 1088 (9th Cir. 2013),
cert. denied 134 S.Ct. 1493 (2014), cert. denied 134 S.Ct. 1494 (2014) (Nos. 1156259, 12-56224).
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program designed to meet that student’s individual educational
needs.
When comparing the IDEA and the ADA, it is clear that the
IDEA puts more pressure on school districts to help and support
individuals with disabilities through their education—this is the Act’s
specific purpose. In ruling that a student can bring claims under both
the IDEA and the ADA for the same situation, the Ninth Circuit did
not honor the purpose of the IDEA.
B.

Congress Intended the IDEA to Govern Issues of Education

The existence of the IDEA’s exhaustion requirement conveys to
courts that Congress intended for the IDEA to take primacy over the
ADA in issues related to students and special education.181 The
IDEA’s exhaustion requirement182 requires that parents and students
exhaust remedies available to them under the IDEA before they seek
the same relief under other federal laws that protect individuals with
disabilities—the language of the exhaustion requirement specifically
includes the ADA.183 As it is explained by the California School
Boards Association: “[A]s long as an ADA claim seeks relief that is
also available under, or is the functional equivalent of relief under the
IDEA, plaintiffs must exhaust IDEA remedies . . . .”184 The IDEA’s
181
See supra note 100 and accompanying text. “For example, the IDEA's
administrative exhaustion requirement has resulted in courts consistently holding
that, inter alia, while section 504 can be used to enforce educational rights, the
administrative procedures required by the IDEA must be exhausted before relief
can be granted.” Mac Lagan, supra note 43, at 744.
182
The language of the “Exhaustion requirement” in the IDEA reads:
Nothing in this title shall be construed to restrict or limit the
rights, procedures, and remedies available under the Constitution,
the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, title V of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, or other Federal laws protecting the
rights of children with disabilities, except that before the filing of
a civil action under such laws seeking relief that is also available
under this part, the procedures under subsections (f) and (g) shall
be exhausted to the same extent as would be required had the
action been brought under this part.
See supra note 100 (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1415(l) (2012)).
183
See supra Part II.B–C.
184
Amicus Curiae Brief of California School Boards Association and the
National School Boards Association In Support of Petitioners at 14, K.M. ex rel.
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language is more detailed than that of the ADA, and the process for
making a claim is more extensive under the IDEA than under the
ADA; this detail points in favor of the IDEA’s primacy.
In addition to the inclusion of the exhaustion requirement in the
IDEA, Congress’s intent is demonstrated by comparing the most
recent amendments to the ADA and the IDEA, respectively. The last
major changes to the IDEA were the 2004 Amendments—also
known as the IDEIA.185 Following the IDEIA, the Department of
Education Office of Special Education and Rehabilitative Services
released the rules and regulations governing the new changes to the
IDEIA to explain the new changes to the states, as well as how to
implement them.186 The changes to the IDEA, as a whole, through
these amendments, were extensive and were made to broaden the
scope of their application to more students. Their purpose was also
to further guarantee that students with disabilities have access to
disability services. 187
As this comment has focused on a case that discussed two DHH
students,188 it is worth noting that the IDEIA included several
provisions specifically to aid DHH students.189 As the California
School Boards Association notes, Congress has taken action to
specifically address the needs of DHH students in amendments to the
IDEA rather than through amendments to the ADA.190 This reveals
Congress’s intent for the IDEA to govern these issues rather than the
ADA.191 The language and communication needs of DHH students
are not even considered in the ADA.192 For example, the definition

Bright, 725 F.3d 1088 (Nos. 13-770, 13-777) [hereinafter Brief of California
School Boards].
185
Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act of 2004, 20
U.S.C. §§ 1400–1475 (2012).
186
Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellant and
Urging Remand at 10, K.M. ex rel. Bright, 725 F.3d 1088 (No. 11-56259),
available at http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/app/briefs/kmtustinbr.pdf.
187
Brief of California School Boards, supra note 184, at 7.
188
See supra Part III.
189
Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act of 2004, §§
1400–1475.
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Brief of California School Boards, supra note 184, at 7.
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of “interpreting services” in the IDEA was changed to include
transcription services such as CART and Typewell for children who
are deaf or hard-of-hearing.193 This service was not an option prior
to the 2004 Amendments, so the addition of this service in
particular—the service at issue in K.M. ex rel. Bright—provides
support for the notion that the IDEA should be controlling over the
ADA. Furthermore, Congress also took care to ensure that the
definition of supplementary aids and services included services that
enable a child to participate in extracurricular and nonacademic
settings in school.194
Additionally, sections in the IDEA regarding IEPs were amended
in order to make the process more inclusive of parents of children
with disabilities.195 The Department of Education clarified that:
[A] child does not have to fail or be retained in a
course or grade in order to be considered for special
education and related services. However, in order to
be a child with a disability under the Act, a child must
have one or more of the impairments identified in
section 602(3) of the Act and need special education
and related services because of that impairment.196
This is an important addition to the IDEA because it makes it
clear that the intended purpose of the IDEA is to be inclusive rather
than exclusive of students with disabilities. The amendments to the
IDEA over time have taken care to include the far more specific
needs of DHH students within the education system, showing that the
IDEA should have primacy over the ADA when deciding matters
concerning education of students with disabilities.

193

See supra Part II.C.
See supra Part II.C.
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See supra Part II.C. But see Demetra Edwards, New Amendments to
Resolving Special Education Disputes: Any Good IDEAs?, 5 PEPP. DISP. RESOL.
L.J. 137, 159 (2005) (arguing that the IDEA amendments make the dispute
resolution process less inclusive of parents of children with disabilities).
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Assistance to States for the Education of Children with Disabilities and
Preschool Grants for Children with Disabilities; Final Rule, 71 Fed. Reg. 156,
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(Aug.
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While the IDEA amendments addressed more specific needs of
students, the most recent set of major amendments to the ADA, the
Americans with Disabilities Act Amendments Act of 2008
(ADAAA) broadened the definition of “disability.”197 The language
of the Act specifically references Congress’s intent: “[T]he intent of
Congress [is] that the primary object of attention in cases brought
under the ADA should be whether entities covered under the ADA
have complied with their obligations[.] . . . [T]he question of whether
an individual’s impairment is a disability under the ADA should not
demand extensive analysis.”198 Congress explained that the purpose
of the ADA Amendments is to shift the focus away from defining a
disability and to move toward assessing whether discrimination is
taking place because of an individual’s disability.199 The purpose of
the ADAAA had very little do with the education of individuals with
disabilities. In fact, the word “education” is mentioned only once in
the entire text of the Act.200 The part of the Act that specifically
197

42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213 (2012). One of the findings and purposes of the
ADAAA was:
[T]o convey congressional intent that the standard created by the
Supreme Court in the case of Toyota Motor Manufacturing,
Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184 (2002) for
‘‘substantially limits’’, and applied by lower courts in numerous
decisions, has created an inappropriately high level of limitation
necessary to obtain coverage under the ADA, to convey that it is
the intent of Congress that the primary object of attention in
cases brought under the ADA should be whether entities covered
under the ADA have complied with their obligations, and to
convey that the question of whether an individual’s impairment is
a disability under the ADA should not demand extensive analysis
....
ADA AMENDMENTS ACT OF 2008, http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS110s3406enr/pdf/BILLS-110s3406enr.pdf (last visited Dec. 31, 2014).
198
ADA AMENDMENTS ACT OF 2008, supra note 197.
199
Id.
200
See generally 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213 (2012). “Education” is
mentioned in the section pertaining to Rules of Construction:
Nothing in this Act alters the provision of section
302(b)(2)(A)(ii), specifying that reasonable modifications in
policies, practices, or procedures shall be required, unless an
entity can demonstrate that making such modifications in
policies, practices, or procedures, including academic
requirements in postsecondary education, would fundamentally
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mentions education does so only to explain that nothing in these
amendments is to alter an institution’s requirement to make
reasonable modifications unless doing so fundamentally alters “the
nature of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or
accommodations involved.”201
Broadening the definition of
“disability” only causes confusion and liability for schools and
districts trying to accommodate students with disabilities.202 The
ADAAA complicates education of individuals with disabilities rather
than improves it,203 and further demonstrates that Congress intended
the IDEA, not the ADA, to govern issues of special education.
C.

The Exhaustion Requirement and the IDEA in Other Federal
Circuits

In Pace v. Bogalusa City School Board,204 the Fifth Circuit Court
of Appeals addressed this issue. The Fifth Circuit disagreed with the
Ninth Circuit and concluded that the failure of an IDEA claim
precludes an ADA claim when the claims under these acts are
factually and legally indistinct.205 In Pace, Travis Pace, a high
school student with physical and developmental disabilities, brought
claims against the school board and the State of Louisiana under the
ADA and the IDEA.206 Suffering from cerebral palsy, Travis was
confined to a wheelchair and challenged the lack of handicap
accessible facilities at Bogalusa High School, as well as deficiencies
in Travis’s IEP.207 The court of appeals adopted the district court’s
ruling that the school had satisfied its obligations to Travis under the
IDEA.208
The court next addressed the ADA claim, first comparing the
alter the nature of the goods, services, facilities, privileges,
advantages, or accommodations involved.
ADA AMENDMENTS ACT OF 2008, supra note 197.
201
ADA AMENDMENTS ACT OF 2008, supra note 197; see also supra note 30.
202
Smith & Bales, supra note 52, at 397.
203
Id. at 413.
204
403 F.3d 272, 274–75 (5th Cir. 2005).
205
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Pace, 403 F.3d at 275.
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accessibility standards under the IDEA and the accessibility
standards under the ADA.209 The court reasoned that if the
accessibility standards are the same, then Travis’s claim under the
ADA is precluded by the court’s rejection of Travis’s claim under the
IDEA.210 The court of appeals agreed with the hearing officer that
FAPE had been provided under the IDEA and dismissed the other
claims on the grounds that they were legally “indistinct” from the
IDEA issue that had already been resolved.211 Therefore, the court
concluded that because the evidence supported that the school had
fulfilled its obligations under the IDEA, Travis was collaterally
estopped from asserting an ADA claim.212
This court based its decision on the legal similarity between the
ADA’s and the IDEA’s accessibility standards and remedies. This is
synonymous with establishing that the IDEA has primacy over the
ADA in issues of special education, but it is persuasive authority.
The Fifth Circuit reasoned that if the remedies are similar or the
same, then a plaintiff is precluded from bringing the same issue under
both acts. Doing so addresses the inefficiency of adjudicating claims
in special education, and as discussed above, Congress intended for
the IDEA to govern issues of education. Travis had been provided
FAPE under the IDEA, so he was precluded from bringing the same
claim under the ADA.
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals held a similar position as the
Fifth Circuit on the relationship between the ADA and the IDEA. In
Independent School District No. 283 v. S.D.,213 the court of appeals
affirmed the district court’s ruling that the school district satisfied the
IDEA’s FAPE requirements.214 The court then explained that the
resolution of this issue resolved the other non-IDEA claims.215
While the ADA is not specifically mentioned in this court’s opinion,
the holding is consistent with the IDEA’s primacy over other federal
laws in issues of education, including the ADA, because the Fifth
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Circuit explained that the non-IDEA claims were necessarily satisfied
through the IDEA ruling. The court specifically addressed the IDEA
claims first, pursuant to the IDEA’s exhaustion requirement.216 As
discussed above, the IDEA’s exhaustion requirement places heavy
weight on the IDEA’s primacy over the ADA in matters of special
education, which is seen in this case—the Fifth Circuit prevented the
plaintiff from bringing an ADA claim under another law when there
was an IDEA remedy.
In placing emphasis on the IDEA, the Fifth and Eighth Circuits
were correct to decide that one act precludes the other in cases in
which the remedies and legal standards for the claim are the same.
As has been discussed, it is true that schools as public entities must
comply with the ADA and schools as institutions of education must
comply with the IDEA, but this causes inefficiency and
inconsistency. Courts, especially in California, should take this one
step further and accept the IDEA as having primacy over the ADA
with all issues that pertain to special education.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The ADA and the IDEA are two federal laws that focus
specifically on individuals with disabilities. Historically, both have
been used to address the same situations that arise with the education
of individuals with disabilities, but this has caused inefficiency and
confusion. While it is not possible, as the education system exists
today, to give individuals with disabilities everything that they need,
it is possible to make the first step towards helping students with
disabilities by giving courts direction as to how they should treat the
interrelationship of federal laws that protect and support these
particular students.
Through the IDEA Exhaustion requirement, the 2004 IDEA
Amendments, and the 2008 ADA Amendments, Congress made its
intent clear—the IDEA should have primacy over the ADA in
matters concerning the education of individuals with disabilities. By
this reasoning, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals was wrong to
conclude that K.M.’s and D.H.’s claims should be litigated under
both the ADA and the IDEA. At first glance, the fairest option

216
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would appear to be to give plaintiffs the opportunity to bring their
education claims under every statute protecting individuals with
disabilities, but to do so breeds inconsistent holdings by the judiciary
and weakens the focus on education.
The IDEA, with all of its complications, does the most to address
the specific learning needs of each student. In California in
particular, a state that is supporting a large student body on limited
resources, allowing courts to evaluate issues under the IDEA at the
exclusion of the ADA will help the special education system develop
in a way that is efficient, and in a way that is the most beneficial for
students with disabilities.

